Global Hyperloop Technology Market 2017 Analysis

According to Stratistics MRC, the Global Hyperloop technology market is expected to grow from $0.132 billion in 2016 to reach $1.78 billion by 2023 with a CAGR of 45.01%. Rapid industrialization, growing population rate, reduced time travel, less land area requirement, less expensive and easier-to-build infrastructure and resistant to natural calamities are the major factors driving the market growth. Lack of awareness regarding the technology usage, government interference, and various safety and security problems are the factors hindering the market growth.

By carriage, the passenger transportation segment is the fastest growing due to its ultimate services in transportation industry and it also provides transport facility at high speed with low cost. In addition, the fastest mode of passenger transport is provided by hyperloop when compared to other transportations such as train, airplane, etc. The hyperloop technology market is likely to be commercialized in Dubai(Asia) by 2022.The extended support from local government, advanced constructional facilities, capital investors and other factors constitute to the commercialization of hyperloop in this region and thus plays a key role in building the first operational hyperloop route between Dubai and Dhabi.

Some of the key players in the Hyperloop market are Hyperloop One, Spacex, Dgwhyperloop, Hyperloop Transportation Technologies, Aecom, Transpod Inc., MIT Hyperloop, Badgerloop, VicHyper, Delft Hyperloop, Open Loop, BITS Hyperloop, AZLoop, UW Hyperloop and WARR Hyperloop.

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My Railroad Stock!

I am sure some of our readers think I own all kinds of railroad stock.

They are wrong! I own one share of railroad stock! It is from the “Warwick Valley Rail Road Company”. In 1882 in joined in a merger that saw the Lehigh & Hudson River Railroad emerge.

The line extended from Belvidere, NJ to Maybrook, NY where the New Haven Railroad provided a gateway to New England. The L&HR built a bridge between Phillipsburg, NJ and Easton, PA and ran via trackage rights on the Pennsylvania RR and the Jersey Central Railroad to Allentown, PA. The L&HR handled zinc traffic from the area around Franklin, NJ but mostly it was a bridge line carrying overhead freight. The mergers and abandonments of the 1960 did the L&HR harm, but the New York Central – PRR merger in 1968 caused much traffic to be diverted. The line went bankrupt in 1972 and inclusion in Conrail spelled the end in 1976. The line north of Sparta Jct. became part of the New York, Susquehanna & Western main line in 1982 and the line south of that point was abandoned by Conrail in 1986.

Read more about the Lehigh & Hudson River
https://penneyandkc.wordpress.com/the-warwick-valley-and-other-railroads-west-of-the-hudson/

HYPERLOOP ONE Keeps Getting Smarter. Soon They Will HYPERLOOP!

Our Company.

Called many things: In the HYPERLOOP World: “The Muhammad Ali HYPERLINK”
Our major project is a HYPERLOOP between Louisville, Kentucky and Chicago

We have always been associated with HYPERLOOP ONE

Always been concerned with HYPERLOOP ONE financing, so we are investing time, thoughts, love with VENTURE CAPITAL people.

HYPERLOOP ONE is growing staff and now able to communicate great ideas with us indians: Three Smart Takes On Hyperloop, The Global Supply Chain, And The Infinite Suburb

To celebrate Infrastructure Week, we hosted a series of conversations with people who have ideas for making the global economy more productive, competitive, and safe. Bottom line: It’s time to invest in new ways to move people and goods. It’s #TimeToBuild.

Q&A: Geo-strategist And Best-selling Author Parag Khanna:
The Emerging Global Power That Knows No Borders

Building Big Projects Requires Big Thinking

What is Hyperloop? It’s the next mode of transportation. Combine the speed of an airplane, the capacity of a metro, the convenience of an automobile and the comfort of an elevator. It’s efficient and on-demand. Only Hyperloop One is building it.

In other projects: The Railroad from Beacon to Hopewell Junction to Southeast is DEAD according to the NY City Metropolitan Transportation Authority. We looked at it. But too short for a HYPERLOOP. Now Governor Cuomo of NY (who REALLY runs the NY City Metropolitan Transportation Authority along with Senator Chuck Schumer) gets his wish A RAIL TRAIL

Baker Hughes, A GE Company

A compelling, transformational combination

 The best partner to Oil & Gas customers … offering solutions based on
complementary equipment & services technology across the full spectrum
of the oil and gas value chain

 More innovative solutions to market faster and more cost effectively …
Baker Hughes’ leading products and services with GE Oil & Gas highly
differentiated manufacturing capabilities

 Best-in class physical + digital technology … combine Baker Hughes
domain expertise, technology and culture of innovation with GE Store and
GE industry-leading Digital Platform

 Value creation for customers and shareholders … positioned to weather
short-term volatility and participate in industry upcycle

Impact for Baker Hughes shareholders

 Ongoing ownership in a stronger, more competitive
business

 Cash dividend of $17.50 per share equal to 30%+ of
undisturbed share price

 Participation in substantial value creation through
synergies

 Revenue growth driven by increased customer touch
points

Deal overview

Merge GE Oil & Gas with Baker Hughes … GE owns 62.5%, new Baker Hughes owns 37.5%
+ Create new, publicly traded company with separate investor base
+ GE to contribute $7.4B to fund cash dividend to Baker Hughes shareholders upfront
+ Close expected mid-2017 … ~$.04 accretive to GE EPS in 2018

Combination of GE Oil & Gas & Baker Hughes establishes a new industry leader
+ 2x scale, complementary capabilities, more diversified
+ Can weather the cycle in short term & over time; significantly levered to recovery

Platform is positioned to deliver substantial customer value
+ Technical solutions  productivity
+ Best digital platform
+ Global execution

Synergy opportunity is substantial … cost and revenue
+ ~$1.6B synergies (~$1.2B cost & ~$0.4B revenue)

Disciplined capital allocation … O&G long-term fit for GE
+ Essential industry & fits GE Store

Efficient transaction structure using like-for-like equity with modest cash outlay
including disposition proceeds

See More about this transaction

How Would You Like To Buy A Railroad Called “Cowboy Substation Line”?

The Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) has issued a request for proposals to seek buyers or operators for two state-owned rail routes: the Cowboy Substation and Blackwell Northern lines. Proposals are due Aug. 17.

The 22-mile Cowboy Substation Line runs between Pawnee Junction and Stillwater, Okla. In 1998, the state of Oklahoma purchased the route from BNSF Railway Co. as part of an asset preservation effort to save as many rail lines as possible from being abandoned and dismantled after several Class Is went bankrupt or merged.

ODOT then sought short-line operators to lease the line to keep it operational and eventually entered into a lease agreement with Stillwater Central Railroad Inc. The department amended the agreement with Stillwater Central — which is owned by Watco Cos. LLC — in January 2013, and the pact is scheduled to expire on Dec. 31, 2017, unless it’s terminated earlier or extended.

The 17-mile Blackwell Northern Line runs between Hunnewell, Kan., and Blackwell, Okla. The Blackwell Industrial Authority (BIA) and ODOT acquired the line from Central Kansas Railway LLC in 1997. ODOT then entered into a lease agreement with the South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad Inc., which in 2002 subsequently assigned all of its lease and operating rights to Blackwell & Northern Railway Co. Inc. (BNGR).

In December 2010, ODOT, BIA and BNGR renewed the lease agreement, which expired in November 2015. Owned by US Rail Partners Ltd., BNGR continues to operate the line under the terms of the expired pact, currently using the route primarily for rail-car storage.

CDPQ Infra proposes 41-mile light-rail system in Montreal

CDPQ Infra, a subsidiary of the Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec, late last week unveiled plans for a 41-mile light-rail system to connect the Greater Montreal region with the city’s downtown and airport.

Known as the Reseau Electrique Metropolitain (REM), the system would have 24 stations and operate 20 hours a day, CDPQ Infra officials said in a press release.

The project is expected to cost $5.5 billion (in Canadian dollars), with the Caisse committing $3 billion. The proposed financial structure would also require investments from the governments of Quebec and Canada.

When completed, the REM would be the third largest automated transportation system in the world after Dubai and Vancouver.

“A network as significant as the one we are proposing could potentially add more than $3 billion to the Quebec GDP over four years. We also expect close to $5 billion in private real estate developments along the chosen route,” said Christian Dube, executive vice president for Quebec at the Caisse.

CDPQ Infra will consult with stakeholders in the coming weeks. Public information sessions also will be held in areas affected by the new network.

CDPQ Infra officials anticipate submitting the project to the environmental impact hearing process by summer’s end.

The Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec is an institutional investor that oversees public pension plans and insurance programs in the province.

Yorkville Bets on the Second Avenue Subway

The eastern Upper East Side, a subway desert, is about to see the end of its drought. In December, nine years after construction of the initial phase began — and decades after it was first proposed — the Second Avenue subway is scheduled to open.

For Yorkville residents, who have endured dust, explosions and barricades while workers burrowed tunnels under their feet, and who make long slogs to Lexington Avenue trains, that moment will probably be joyous.

But those who live in apartment buildings between Third and York Avenues, as well as those developing new ones, may already be celebrating: Their property is enjoying new attention and price premiums, a trend that doesn’t bode well for buyers in search of bargains.

“The subway has totally changed things,” said Michael Lorber, an associate broker with Douglas Elliman Real Estate at the Azure, a 128-unit condop at 333 East 91st Street and First Avenue, which began sales in 2008, the year the subway project started. In fall 2014, when Mr. Lorber and his team took over sales at the 34-story high-rise, developed by the DeMatteis Organizations and the Mattone Group, there were 25 unsold sponsor units. By late last month, he said, just three were left, at an average list price of $1,600 per square foot.

The condop, which sits on leased land and was the site of a fatal crane accident in 2008, was hindered by other issues, Mr. Lorber said, but buyers were deterred, in particular, by its relative remoteness. “If the building were built today,” he added, “it would sell right away.”

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Measuring the precise effect of the subway construction on property values is difficult, because while the construction has caused a number of inconveniences (including the closing of parts of sidewalks and streets), it also coincided with a massive housing downturn. And this part of the Upper East Side has been falling out of favor for years, brokers say. But anecdotal evidence suggests that prices for co-ops and condominiums here dropped about 20 percent — a discount that is long gone, according to most brokers. Moreover, the prices of many apartments now reflect a subway bonus of about 10 percent, they say.

“The post-subway premium is already in effect,” said Itay Gamlieli, the owner of GZB Realty, who often works on the Upper East Side and lives there as well.

The modest blocks east of Third Avenue have long had lower prices than the fancier parts of the Upper East Side, known as the Silk Stocking District. But the new subway stations at East 72nd, East 86th and East 96th Streets, and the expanded one at East 63rd, seem to be having an equalizing effect on prices in what used to be more of a cotton socks district. (Initially, those stations will offer access to an extension of the Q line; later, they will service the T train as well.)

Consider the Kent, a 30-story, 83-unit brick, limestone and metal-paneled condo from the Extell Development Company rising at 200 East 95th Street, at Third Avenue. Prices for its spacious two- to five-bedroom apartments, which have up to 15-foot ceilings, marble-lined baths and Miele appliances, will start at about $2.4 million, or $2,500 a square foot, when sales begin in May, said Gary Barnett, Extell’s president.

The average price for condos in Yorkville — excluding East End Avenue, which is often considered an upscale submarket unto itself — was about $1,700 a square foot in late March, according to StreetEasy.com.

Mr. Barnett is hardly a builder-come-lately to the neighborhood. He began acquiring his blockwide site, made up of seven lots, when the subway was still in planning mode in 2005. But improved transportation was on his mind: The subway expansion “gave us confidence that we could invest and do a beautiful product, and that people would pay for it,” he said of his project, which will have a lobby fireplace, a courtyard garden and a pool.

More market-rate Extell projects are planned for the area, Mr. Barnett added, although he declined to provide specifics.

If the Kent will test the ceiling of the market, Carnegie Park, a 30-story brick rental-to-condo conversion at 200 East 94th Street and Third Avenue, from the Related Companies, might indicate the market’s velocity. In about 15 months, the condo has sold 85 percent of its 277 one- to four-bedrooms, which have Caesarstone counters and KitchenAid appliances, according to a spokeswoman for the project, and prices are averaging $1,700 a square foot, with one-bedrooms starting at $980,000.

While the Carnegie Park website doesn’t mention the coming subway — perhaps because the Lexington Avenue line is a block to the west — other developments are more explicit. On the site for the Charles, a new 27-unit, 31-story condo from Bluerock Real Estate at 1355 First Avenue near East 73rd Street, a map shows the future Q and T stop at East 72nd. The building, which has six remaining units, is getting an average of $2,400 a square foot, said R. Ramin Kamfar, Bluerock’s chief executive.

Another building expected to benefit from the Second Avenue line is 389 East 89th Street, at First Avenue, a 31-story rental that the Magnum Real Estate Group is converting into a condo with 156 one- to three-bedrooms. Sales began in February, with prices averaging $1,600 a square foot, a project spokesman said, and one-bedrooms starting at $880,000.

While Second Avenue has improved since 2010, when dozens of businesses were closed, it’s hardly back to its old self. There are still shuttered storefronts between East 93rd and East

94th Streets, and cranes remain visible. But most buyers realize these are temporary inconveniences, said Victor Setton, a salesman with Weichert Rockefeller Center: “They’re taking a long view.”

This month, Mr. Setton is listing a one-bedroom co-op at 301 East 87th Street and Second Avenue, where concrete barriers give the street a work-in-progress look. But the $815,000 price, he said, includes a premium of about $50,000 for the future subway stop around the corner.

Some remain skeptical that the subway, which was originally proposed in the 1930s and has broken ground a couple of times since then, will open on time. The first phase, after all, is being delivered with a bigger price tag — $4.451 billion — than promised, and at a later date. “Who knows when it will ultimately be finished?” said Jay Solinsky, the president of Classic Marketing, which is helping to sell 300 East 64th Street, a 99-unit condo conversion at Second Avenue developed by RFR Holding.

For Elizabeth Dean, the subway can’t arrive soon enough. Ms. Dean, who moved into a one-bedroom in Carnegie Park from a studio in Hell’s Kitchen this winter, commutes to her financial services job in Midtown using the 6 train, though that line is often crowded at rush hour.

The Q train might relieve some of that congestion, she hopes, and drop her closer to work; the Metropolitan Transportation Authority estimates that the trip from East 96th Street to Times Square will take just 13 minutes.

Do Any Of Our Readers Remember AGWAY?

(Pictured above is Cooperstown & Charlotte Valley number 100 making a delivery to the Milford, NY AGWAY. Photo by Michael Bates from Gino’s Rail Blog.)

WHAT WENT WRONG AT AGWAY

by Bruce L. Anderson and Brian M. Henehan

On October 1, 2002 Agway filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Many people are still asking what went wrong. This is a hasty attempt by the authors to analyze the situation. We hope that this short article will provide valuable lessons for other cooperatives and organizations.

First, a little history. Agway was formed in 1964, the result of a merger between GLF(Grange League Federation) and Eastern

States Farmers’ Exchange. A year later the Pennsylvania Farm Bureau Cooperative merged into Agway. The result was a very large

agricultural supply and marketing cooperative that covered 13 states, spanning from Maryland to Maine to Eastern Ohio.

Historic Factors: Provide Members A Secure Market

Cooperatives are often formed to provide members a secure source of inputs and markets for their products. However, sometimes this motive can go to extremes. GLF (i.e. Agway), together with other New

York agricultural organizations, provided the leadership in establishing a radio network, Rural Radio Network, in 1946 to serve the radioneeds of farmers and rural residents. It was sold in 1959 when it had an accumulated deficit of $970,000 and total debt to GLF (i.e. Agway) of $1.36 million.

In 1946 GLF also bought approximately a 40 percent share of Mohawk Airlines,  the forerunner of USAirways, in the name of providing air transportation to Upstate New York. In this case, they fortunately saw their investment more than double before it was sold.

Another example was Agway’s attempt to provide services to members was its operation, together with Southern States

Cooperative, of Texas City Refining. The purpose was to provide

members a secure source of petroleum products. This proved extremely advantageous and profitable during the oil shortages of the early 1970’s.  However, the petroleum market eventually changed and Texas City proved a costly investment. It was sold in 1988 at a loss of $110 million.

In 1961, GLF helped form Curtice-Burns, a vegetable and fruit processing company, headquartered in Rochester, N.Y. Curtice-Burns was a combination of what were at the time two struggling vegetable processing companies. Over the years, the company was very successful, but in 1993 Agway announced that it’s controlling interest in Curtice-Burns was up for sale. The sale brought in a solid return, and this was one of the first indications that Agway needed cash to fund its other operations.

Emphasis on Size

In the 1970’s and 1980’s, Agway was the largest cooperative in the

U.S., with sales of over $4.1 billion in 1984. At the time there was

an emphasis on cooperative size.  Agway being on the Fortune 100

list of U.S. companies was often mentioned in publications and meetings.

We believe that any organization that places primary importance on size over profitability can likely run into problems. We would argue that this is a malady that also eventually caused Farmland Industries and Ocean Spray their financial problems.

Ability to Manage Many Types of Businesses

There was a longstanding attitude at Agway, and predecessor organizations, that they could manage any type of business, even when other people could not.

Two major examples come to mind in Agway’s history.

The first was an effort in 1941 to get into the retail food business by starting the Cooperative Producers and Consumers Markets, today a Northeast grocery retail chain called P&C. The purpose was to assist New York farmers market meat from their livestock. Ownership interest in P&C was finally sold in 1961 following several years of unprofitable operations.

A more recent example was the purchase of H.P. Hood, a fluid dairy company, bought in 1980. A driving motivation was to help members of Northeast dairy cooperatives maintain a reliable and stable market for their milk, which was at risk. The fluid milk business has always

been very competitive, and operates much differently than an agricultural supply company.

Agway had no prior experience running a fluid milk business. In 1995, H.P. Hood was sold due to less than projected returns on their

investment and mounting financial losses. Another interesting aspect of this example was that right up to their purchase of H.P. Hood, Agway had a strict policy that they would not become involved in dairy processing.

Corporate Culture

We are sure some readers are already wondering why several of the above examples dateback to the 1940’s. We firmly believe there is significant historical momentum in all types of organizations. This is often embodied in what today is called “corporate culture”. Agway

instilled a lot of corporate culture in their directors, management, and employees. In fact, we remember when every Agway meeting or at any meeting that an Agway representative spoke at started with a recitation of the Agway mission. However, many of Agway’s old traditions and strategies may have out lived their usefulness or detracted from their willingness to change.

A $25 Equity Investment

To become a member of Agway, all a farmer needed to do was buy one share of common stock for $25. And that is all the investment many members have in the cooperative. We firmly believe there is a strong link between how much money members have at risk in a cooperative, and the interest they take in their cooperative, as well as the success of the organization.

Use Of Tax Paid Retained Earnings

Since equity was not coming from members, Agway used Tax

Paid Retained Earnings as their primary source of equity. Depending on this source of equity means that a cooperative needs to consistently generate positive Net Income. It is also an expensive source of equity, because corporate taxes must be paid by the

cooperative reducing the total funds available to build equity. In addition, when a cooperative becomes dependent on Tax Paid Retained Earnings, there is a greater tendency for the

cooperative to become “management controlled” rather than “member controlled”, given that member equity does not grow and most members have little equity at risk.

Heavy Use of Debt

Agway has always been highly leveraged. If compared to their competitors in almost any business, they would likely be one of the most heavily leveraged companies. During the entire 1984-2002 period Agway’s highest Equity to Total Asset ratio was 20.6%. From

1998-2001 Equity to Total Assets averaged 12.6%. Our general

rule of thumb is that when equity to total assets drops below 15% an organization is suffering severe financial problems. At one point it time, Agway had a goal of using one-third bank financing, one-third

subordinated debentures and one-third equity, primarily tax paid

retained earnings. During the entire 1984-2002 period, this goal was never achieved.

Subordinated Debt

Most of Agway’s debt, especially in latter years, was subordinated debt, also known as “junk bonds” because they are not secured by

assets. While the level of the company’s subordinated debt has remained relatively level over the past 5 years, operating cash flow to

support that debt became inadequate and deteriorated. As of it’s bankruptcy filing, the largest single owner of these subordinated debentures was Agway’s employees through pension fund and 401-K investments. They total approximately $35 million out a total of $425 million in subordinated debt. Members and public security holders own the remaining amount.

Limited Patronage Refunds

Except for 1987 and 1988, Agway has not paid a patronage refund to members since 1980. The primary reason is that sufficient Earnings were not being generated from the patronage business, i.e. their

agricultural supply operations. Most of Net Income came from

non-patronage businesses such as petroleum, leasing, insurance and produce distribution.

Excess Capacity

With the largest market share for feed and many other input supplies in the Northeast, Agway has been prone to carrying excess capacity, which is typical of a market leader. At the same time there was a major change in market conditions. In terms of feed, more farmers started mixing their own feed using direct purchased commodities, and moved away from the use of pelletized feed. This meant that many of Agway’s feed, and other input supply plants, were operating at significantly less than full capacity. This has a negative impact on per unit costs and can often lead to cut throat price competition.

A Triple Delivery System

For most of it’s existence, Agway had a triple delivery system with:

1) Agway Inc. owned corporate stores,

2) independent local cooperative stores, and

3) franchise representative stores.

There was a period when Agway tried to convert their corporate

stores into representative stores.

Then in the early 1990’s a decision was made to buy out all the independent local cooperatives to consolidate the delivery system. Financial performance did not improve because market

conditions continued to change.

Beginning in 1999, Agway sold or closed all its remaining company owned stores and sold their warehouse system to Southern States Cooperative. These moves were made because returns on these assets were chronically inadequate. Today most store customers do not realize that the cooperative no longer owns any assets related to the store distribution system. However, Agway remains a supplier to dealers and retains rights and revenues related to use of the Agway name.

Recent Issues and valuable tables are included in the full version of this report.

Mother’s Market & Kitchen Expansion

Editors Note: WholeFoods Magazine recently reported on a new partnership between Mother’s Market & Kitchen and Mill Road Capital investment firm. Our very own merchandising editor Jay Jacobowitz provides some insight on the potential of this new partnership and what it means for the supernatural retail space.

This is a significant event in the natural organic products retail space. Costa Mesa, California-based Mother’s Market & Kitchen, founded in 1978, and now with seven supermarket-size locations in Southern California, possesses some of the most valuable real estate in the nation. By this I mean household quality and demand potential for natural organic products is extremely high; among the best in the country according to our Retail Insights’ Retail Universe for Natural, Organic Food, Supplement and Personal Care Sales database. In addition, the stores are first-rate operations, with excellent food service offerings, dynamic merchandising, beautiful facilities, and the highest ingredient standards in the industry.

Coupling with Greenwich, Connecticut-based Mill Road Capital (MRC) should be a wake-up call for all supernatural competitors. MRC Senior Managing Director, Thomas Lynch, handled the private equity business for Blackstone Group, which manages over $300 billion in investor funds. Lynch has borrowed a page from Blackstone, locking up investor capital for 10 years; a requirement of investing with Blackstone and MRC. By doing so, MRC can take the long view with its investment portfolio, allowing it to mature companies at their own intrinsic growth rates, and inoculating them from transient external factors, such as economic shocks or sector slowdowns.

Certainly, Mother’s Market could have attracted private equity capital long ago, in the 1990s for example, as Austin, Texas-based Whole Foods Market was executing its “roll-up” strategy of buying the most significant supernatural competitors around the country. But Mother’s Market did not take this route, content instead to focus on its regional trade area and build an unequaled brand identity of superior quality.

I predict the acquisition by MRC signals management intends to continue to pursue the long game, waiting patiently for ideal real estate before signing leases, and being careful to maintain reasonable proximities between stores to maximize distribution efficiencies. The growth plan may resemble the Cheesecake Factory, which chooses its real estate extremely carefully, only opening stores with optimal locations, and never settling for suboptimal real estate. I suspect Mother’s Market & Kitchen will do something similar as it builds out from its Southern California base.

MTA to sell $500 million in ‘green’ bonds to fund infrastructure upgrades

It is ABOUT TIME. The stock market gave us the New York Central Railroad, the New Haven Railroad and the NY Subway system.

The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) on Feb. 17 will issue its first-ever “green” bonds to raise funds for infrastructure renewal projects at New York City Transit, Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North Railroad.

The agency expects to net $500 million in proceeds from the bond sale, MTA officials said in a press release. The money will go toward projects on the three railroads that began during the MTA’s 2010-2014 capital program.

Also known as climate bonds, green bonds provide a means for raising capital for climate-friendly projects, including transit.

“By leaving their cars at home and embracing mass transit, New Yorkers play a dramatic role in reducing carbon emissions,” said MTA Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Thomas Prendergast. “These bonds recognize the ways in which mass transit and commuters work together to keep carbon out of the atmosphere.”

The MTA’s green bonds were certified by the Climate Bonds Initiative, an international not-for-profit organization that supports financing for projects aimed at mitigating the impacts of climate change. To be certified, a bond offering needs to meet “rigorous criteria” regarding reporting and transparency and the environmentally-friendly characteristics of underlying assets, MTA officials said.

Eligible projects funded with the bonds need to be clearly identified, and sellers must set up internal processes and controls to ensure tracking of proceeds. Additionally, the issuer must commit to ongoing annual reporting of assets funded with green bond proceeds.

Today, the MTA is launching a targeted marketing campaign aimed at encouraging New Yorkers to consider purchasing the bonds.

The sale of “green” bonds is becoming more prevalent in the transit industry. Earlier this month, the Ontario government issued its second green bond and raised $750 million (in Canadian dollars) to support environmental friendly projects, including two transit-rail initiatives. And in August 2015, Sound Transit sold nearly $1 billion worth of the bonds to fund transportation projects in Seattle and neighboring regions.